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The  countries  of  Eastern  Europe  have much  to  gain from
stabilizing their economies and integrating them with the world
economy.  They should make trade reforms  a high priority.
Policymakers there should look at the recenteconomie history of
other nations for lessons.
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The Bank introduced adjustment lending in 1979  output  will respond.  Recent experience in other
to help member co-itries  restructure their  countries suggests several constructive steps that
economies to creau. conditions conducive to  Eastern European countries can take to ease their
equitable growth while maintaining a sustainable  transition to market economies:
balance of payments.  Adjustment lending sets
policy reforms as conditions of a loan.  *  Policymakers should place a high priority
on dealing with high open or repressed inflation
A review of the experience of other nations  and other manifestations of severe macroeco-
with adjustment problems may provide useful  nomic imbalances such as unsustainable current
knowledge for Eastern Europe as the region  account deficits or very large positive real
attempts to make the transition to market econo-  interest rates.
mies and to integrate with the world economy.
At the same time, they should  remo'se
Reforrns such as those that Eastern Europe is  restrictions on labor mobility and on the exit and
initiating now have little precedent in recent  entry of firms at the same pace as they liberalize
economic history.  Evidence from other coun-  trade.  In that way, reforms can achieve an
tries indicates, however, that output levels are  increase in output early rather than causing
likely to suffer in the early years of massive  increasing unemployment.
economic restructuring.  Governments must be
aware of these adjustment costs, which represent  *  Decisionmakers should niove early to create
an investment in a better economic system.  markets for work-ing  capital financing - with
appropriate mechanisms to assess credit risks-
If they want their investment to be highly  in order to encourage economic restructuring.
profitable, they must prepare a coherent pro-  The creation of a full-fledged financial system is
gram, hold fast to their policies, and remove  not urgent and should take place only after the
impediments to factor allocation.  As the cred-  countries have achieved economic stabilization.
ibility of the reforms increases, investment and
F  The PRE Working Paper Serics disseminates the findings of work under way in the Bank's Plolicy,  Research, and Excrmal  I
AffairsComplex. An objective oftheserics is to get these findings outtquickly,  even ifpresentations are less than fullypolished.
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions in thcse papers do not necessarily represent official Bank policy.
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I.  I -ODUCTION
The  World  Bank introduced  Adjustment  Lending  as another  form  of lending
in 1979  to assist  member  countries  in their  adjustment  to the  second  oil
shock. The  main difference  between  this form  of lending  and traditional
project  lending  is that  Adjustment  Lending  is quick-disbursing,  and  it is  made
conditional  on policy  reforms. After  growing  rapidly  in the  first  half of the
1980s,  Adjustment  Lending  leveled  off  in 1986-88,  when it averaged  24 percent
of Bank  Group  lending  commitments. In 1989  it reached  27 percent  of total
lending  commitments. The  two  principal  instruments  of adjustment  lending  are:
Structural  Adjustment  Loans  (SALs)  and Sectoral  Adjustment  Loans (SECALs).
SALs  support  economy-wide  reforms  and institutional  building,  while SECALs
have more of a sector focus.'
One  could  ask  why was adjustment  lending  introduced  in 1979. By the
late  1970s  a large  number  of countries  were having  difficulties  in financing
their  balance  of payments  deficits. At the  same  time,  their  growth
performance  was  very  weak.  Common  causes  of these  difficulties  were many
years  of distortionary  trade,  regulatory  and  exchange  rate  policies,  and  an
expansion  of the  state's  role in the  allocation  process. Ultimately,  these
factors  resulted  in an inefficient  use  of reeources,  discouraged  exports  and
created  an internationally  uncompetitive  structure  of production. Countries
facing  this  type  of problems  were spread  throughout  different  geographical
regions,  including  among  otherse  Ghana,  Senegal,  and  Tanzania  in  Africa,
Jamaica,  Argentina,  Bolivia  and  Turkey  elsewhere. When the  second  oil  shock
hit  in 1979,  these  economies  were ill-prepared  to absorb  higher  prices  without
Both types  of loans  generally  disburse  against  general  imports  with a
small  list  of excluded  items.2
radice'.  ihanges  in  their  economic  policies  and institutions.  As there  were
major gains  to  be obtained  from  reducing  inefficiencies  in the  use of
resources,  in  particular,  from  removing  excessive  regulation  and from  reducing
part of the  anti-export  bias of their  policies  --  stabilization  programs
accompanied  by reforms  toward  a market  based  allocation  process  could  reduce
the  cost  of the  oil shock.
The  main purpose  of adjustment  lending  is to  help  member  countries
restructure  their  economies  to create  the  conditions  for  equitable  growth
while  maintaining  a sustainable  balance  of payment  situation. Structural
adjustment  programs  include  measures  to achieve  or consolidate  macroeconomic
stabilization  and  the  structural  transformation  of the  economy. Adjustment
lending  facilitates  the  phased  reduction  of the  current  account  deficit  while
reforms  are  being  introduced  allowing  the  country  to  have a higher  level  of
expenditures  than  otherwise  and  in this  way reduces  the  short-run  adjustment
costs  to output,  employment  and  consumption. The  risk  of this  type  of lending
is that  while  it  provides  financing  that  helps  to sustain  expenditure  levels,
it could  also  result  in the  postponement  of  necessary  reforms. Conditionality
is introduced  to ensure  that  loan  disbursement  is tied  to the  implementation
of an agreed  program.
As some  countries  were adjusting  to the  second  oil shock  and  some  others
were plcnnning  the  transition  from  financing  to adjustment,  they  were faced
with the  consequences  of major  policy  changes  in the  industrial  countries.
Following  the  frontal  attack  on inflation  that  most industrial  countries
initiated  in late  1979-  early  1980s,  interest  rates  reached  their  highest
level  in 50 years,  the  industrial  countries  entered  in a  major recession,  and
primary  commodity  prices  collapsed. To  make  matters  even  worse,  following
Mexico's  difficulties  in servicing  its  foreign  debt  in late 1982,  commercial3
lending  to developing  countries  all  but disappeared. Current  aCcouxt*  deficits
that  could  be financed  without  much difficulties  in 1981,  all of a  sudden
could  not  be financea  at all.  For  most countries  the  urgency  of adjustment
increased. In countries  where large  distortions  and  institutional  weakness
were preventing  the  economy  from  producing  as  much as it  might,  the  removal  of
these  distortions  was seen  as  a  less  costly  option  than  reducing  the  current
account  deficit  by solely  reducing  expenditures.  Not  surprisingly,  more
countries  had to initiate  adjustment  programs: Chile,  South  Korea,  Thailand,
Uruguay,  Ghana,  Mexico,  etc..
Following  these  developments  in the  international  economy,  it is not
surprising  that  adjustment  lending  grew  rapidly  in the  first  half of the
19808.
A difference  should  be  made between  structural  adjustment  programs  and
adjustment  lending. Countries  have  been implementing  structural  adjustment
programs  for  a long  time  on their  own  while the  Bank  has been supporting
countries  in the  preparation  of and  implementation  of adjustment  programs
since  at least  the late  19509. However,  quick  disbursing  balance  of payments
support  for  adjustment  programs  was introduced  only in 1979.
The  Bank  periodically  evaluates  the  design  and  implementation  of
adjustment  programs. Two  recent  comprehensive  reviews  we recently  carried  out
by the  World  Bank (1988a  and 1990a). The  Bank  also carries  out  a research
program  on economic  development  with heavy  focus  on current  and  prospective
problems  of developing  countries. The findings  of this research  and  of the
research  carried  out  elsewhere  provide  important  underpinnings  for  the  Bank's
advice  on the  design  of adjustment  lending  operations.
The rest  of this  paper  is divided  into  four  sections. Section  2
presents  the  emerging  consensus  on the  design  of adjustment  programs. The4
third  section  nresents  the  main findings  of the  second  report  on adjustment
lending  on effectiveness  of adjustment  lending  and  on implementation  of
programs. Section  4 reviews  the  findings  of  RAL-2  on policies  for  the
recovery  of growth. Finally,  Section  5  presents  some  lessons  on program
design  for  Eastern  Europe.
II. EMERGING  CONSENSUS  ON  'ROGRAM  DESIGN
From research  done analyzing  economic  reforms  in  developing  countries,
both  successful  and  some  unsuccessful,  some  important  lessons  have emerged.
these  lessons  have served  as the  basis  for  an emerging  professional  consensus
on  program  design. Of course,  the  particulars  of a country-specific
adjustment  programs  need  to  take  into  account  the  economic  and  political
conditions  in each  country.
For reforms  to be succesiful,  they  should  have  a  good chance  of  making
important  progress  in removing  the  impediments  which  prevent  obtaining  the
maximimum  output  from  existing  resources. In countrien  with  major impediments
to resource  reallocation  in the  form  of high  and  variable  inflat..ion,  high
level  and  high  variance  of tariff  rates,  rentrictions  to factor  mobility,  ill-
defined  property  rights,  and  a large  public  sector  sheltered  from  efficiency
considerations,  any  reform  effort  that  does  not address  these  barriers  would
have a low  chance  of success. Furthermore,  without  removing  these
impediments,  reforms  will have  low  credibility  and could  unleash  responses
that  could  result  in a deterioration  of the  economic  situation  instead  of an
improvement  (Calvo,  1989).
In countries  that  are  experiencing  acute  macroeconomic  imbalances
manifested  in the  form  of high  open  or repressed  inflation,  large  fiscali  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~5
deficits  and  major  balar:.e  of payments  crises,  structural  reforms  should  start
by attacking  the  ultimate  2auses  of the  macroeconomic  crisis  (Fischer,  1986;
Corbo  and  de Melo, 1987;  ';achs,  1987;  Corbo  nd Fischer,  1990;  and  Rodrik,
1990). As the  success  rate of stabilization  programs  in countries  that  have
experienced  a  prolonged  period  of inflation  is  very poor,  it is  very dangerous
to proceed  simultaneously  with reforms  whose ultimate  success  depend  on the
control  of inflation  (i.e.,  major  trade  and financial  liberalization).
Successful  stabilization  attempts  have included  major  fiscal  adjustment  in the
form  of cuts in government  spending,  reductions  in ltrge  subsidies,  reduction
in  public  enterprises  losses,  and  drastic  reduction  in  central  bank losses
(Dornbusch,  1989;  Kiguel  and  Liviatan,  1988). In the  period  immediately  after
the  Second  World  War, monetary  reform  was used to avoid  an explosion  in
inflatior.  by countries  that  had  accumulated  a  large  money  uverhang  during  the
war years  (Dornbusch  and  Wolf, 1990). Some of these  reforms  to restore
macroeconomic  stability  could  requ'.re  major  structural  reforms  in the
operation  of public  enterprises,  the  tax syster4,  and  the  financial  system  in
order  to establish  the  capacity  to evaluate  loans  on a commercial  basis.  In
countries  with a  large  public  sector,  including  pu'  enterprises  with  major
losses  and  widespread  government  subsidies,  the  stabilization  could  require  a
major  overhaul  of the  public  sector  (Chile,  1973-76;  Mexico,  1982-89;
Argentina,  1989-  ).  Major increases  in labor  mobility  and  flexibility  for
the  hiring  and firing  of labor  should  !be  introduced  early  on to facilitate  the
stabilization.  Parallel  programs  to  provide  a safety  net  to the temporarily
unemployed  could  increase  the  political  acceptance  and  make the  program  more
equitable.6
Once enough  progress  has  been achieved  ixn  reducing  --  in  a credible  way
--  the inflation  and  the  balance  of  payments  dAficit,  other  atructu~ral  reforms
aimed  at improving  resource  allocation  and  achieving  sustainable  and  equitable
growth  should  be attempted. These  reforms  include: public  sector  reforms,
trade  reforms,  financial  reforms,  reforms  of the  regulatory  framework  and
labor  market  reform-.
III. HAIN FINDTNGS  OF  RAL-2:  EFFECTIVENESS  OF PROGRAMS  AND PROGRAM
IMPLEMENTATION 2
For  countries  experiencing  acute  macroeconomic  imbalances  and  which
suffer  from  deep  rooted  structural  problems  that impede  a  better  use  of
resources  and  limit  growth,  the  benefits  from  a structural  reform  program  will
take time  to deveJop. Therefore,  to  assess  adequately  the  effectiveness  of
adju-.tment  programs,  enough  time should  be allowed  to elapse  since  the
initiation  of the  program  before  it is  examined. Intermediate  evaluations
could  rely  on  indicators  of progress  in the  adjustment. That  is the  route
followed  in the  Bank's  two  reports  on  Adjustment  Lending  (RAL-1  and  RAL-2).
A.  Effectiverness  of Adjustment  Programs--Macroeconomic  Indicators
To assess  the  contribution  of adjustment  lending  to sustainable  growth,
the second  Report  on Adjustment  Lending  (RAL-2)  examines  performance  in terms
of intermediate  indicators  of structural  transformation--saving  ratios,
investment  ratios,  and  export  ratios--along  with the  rate  of growth  of output.
For  the  analysis,  countries  are  grouped  into  three  cat _ries:  early
2  This  section  and the  next draw  heavily  on  World  Bank (199Ob).7
intensive-adjustment-lending  (EIAL),  other  adjustment  lending  (OAL),  and
non-adjustment-lending  (HAL)  (Table  1).'
The  observed  performance  of an adjusting  country  results  from (a)  the
policies  that  would  have  been in  place  in the  absence  of adjustment  lending
from  the  Bank, (b)  world economic  conditions,  (c)  the  effects  of a
Bank-supported  program,  and (d)  other  shocks  to the  economy  (droughts,
earthquakes,  etc.).  To isolate  the  net  cos.tribution  of the  Bank-supported
program,  a c,unter-factual  scenario  was created  by estimating  the  effects  on
perfox tnce  of:
*  External  shocks  (interest  rate,  terms  of trade,  non-official
lending).
*  The  economic  policies  in the  pro-program  period  (indicated  by the
real  exchange  rate,  ratio  of the  fiscal  deficit  to GDP,  and  annual
rate of inflation).
3  The groups  of countries  and  periods  used  here are  different  from  those
of RAL - 1.  Here the EIAL countries  include  all the intensive-adjustment-
lending  cc  rntries  of RAL  - 1  plus  13  more.  Because  another  year  of performance
can be looked  at,  the  RAL  - 2 intensive  adjusters  include  additional  countries
whose second  or third  adjuatment  loans  came after 1985.  Within each group  a
breakdown  is  made  between  low-  and  middle-income  countries.  Low-income  countries
are  defined  as all  the  IDA  cour~ies  (including  those  receiving  a  blend  of IDA
and  IBRD loans)  and  the  middle-income  countries  as all  the  rest.
The  Bank's  first  Report  on  Adiustment  Lending  (RAL  - 1)  concluded  that  by
the end of 1987 the 30 countries  receiiving  structural  adjustment  loans (SALs)
before  1985  performed  better  on average  than  did the developing  countries  not
receiving  such loans.  This conclusion  was based on two comparisons:  the
performance  of  countries  before  and  after  receiving  adjustme  :  loansl  the  average
performance  of  countries  receiving  adjustment  loans  before  1985  and  of  countries
not  receiving such loans.  The  30 countries receiving loans had  modest
improvements  in performance,  despite  a more unfavorable  external  environment,
as compared  with the  other  group  of countries. The 12  countries  that  received
3 or  more adjustment  loans  before  1987  had  more pronounced  improvements.8
Table  1:  Country  Classification





Costa Rica  Padstan'
Cote d'lvoire  Philippines
Ghana *  Senegal'
Jamaica  Tanzania'
Kenya'  *hailand
Korea, Rep. of  Togo #
Madagascar *  Turkey
Malawi "  Zambia'
Mauritania '
1. OAL  (Other  A  i,  nment-LrndinS  Cw  Wies)25)
Argentina  Indonesia
Bangladeshe  Mai '
Burkdna  Faso '  Niger'
Burundi *  Panama
Central African Rep.  Sierra Leone'
Chna'  Somalia
Congo, People's Rep.  of  Sudan I
Ecuador  Tunisia
Guinea '  Unrguay
Cuinea-Bissau'  Yugoslavia
Cuyana '  Zaire '
Honduras  Zimbabwe
Hungary
10.  NAL (Non-AMtmei5-Lending  CountrLes)  (28)
Algeria (NA)  Malaysia  N)
Benin '  (NA)  Myanmar I (NA)
Boswana (NW)  Nicaragua (NA)
Cameroon (NA)  Oman (NN)
Dominican Republic (NA)  Papua New Guinea (NA)
Egypt, Arab Rep.  of (NA)  Paraguay (NA)
El Salvador (NN)  Peru (NA)
Ethiopia '  (NA)  Portugal (NW)
Greece (NN)  Rwanda"  (NA)
Guatemala  (NN)  Sri Lanka *  (NA)
Haiti'  (NA)  Syrlan Arab Republic tNN)
India'  (  N)  Trinidad and Tobago (NA)
jordan  (NA)  Venezuela  (NA)
Liberia '  (NA)  Yemen Arab Republic '(NW)
EIAL  are countries  that have  received  2 S. La  or 3 Adjustment
Operators or more,  with  the  first  adjustmint  opersati in 1985  or
before.
OAL  are  other  countries  receiving  adjustment  lending.
NAL  are countries  that did not receive  AL  in the  period  1980  to 1988.
Low  incomne  countiies  (') am IDA  countries,  and  middle  itcome
countries  are non-IDA  countries.
NA  are countries  that did not adjust  although  it was  necessary  for them
to do so.
NN  are other  NAL  countries.9
v  The initial  values  of the  four  indicators  of macroeconomic
adjustment  - real  GDP growth  and  the  ratios  of investment,  saving,
and  exports  to  GDP.-
We compare  the  performance  as  measured  by the  four indicators  in 1985-88,  the
period  after  adjustment  was initiated,  with  performanct  in 1970-80  and in
1981-84. Because  some  countries  started  to receive  adjustment  lending  in the
.early  1980s,  the  base period  1970-80  corresponds  more closely  to the  period
before  adjustment  lending. 4
Befor6-and-after  comparisons  of performance  indicators  provide  useful
background  for  the  counterfactual  analysis,  whose results  are  presented  later.
Although  we cannot  judge  a program's  effectiveness  on the  1- is  of before-
and-after  comparisons,  they  are likely  to be important  to the  political
viability  of the adjustment  programs. Before-and-after  comparisons  can  be
obtained  from the  data  reported  in Table  2.
it is  possible  that  exogenous  influences  that  had  nothing  to do  with the
Bank-supported  adjustment  programs  could  have led  to the  observed  improvemen'
in GDP  growth,  the saving  rate,  and  tne export  rate  of the  EIAL countries  ia
1985-88,  after  the  Bank-supported  adjustment  programs  started. These
influences  include  hi3her  export  prices,  lower  import  prices,  lover  interest
rates  on external  debt,  and  higher  external  financing. To asseso  the
contribution  of adjustment  programs  to  macroeconomic  performance,  the  actual
performance  of a country  in the  period  after  adjustment  was initiated
(1985-88)  must be compared  with an  estimated  counterfactual  scenario  of what
4  The  base  period  1970-80  was chosen  because  it  preceded  the  major  shocks
of the  early 1980s  and is  not dominated  by conditions  in a particular  year  or
two.  Performance  in 1985-88  is also  compared  with that in 1981-84.TABLE  2
COUNTRY  PERFORHANCES
Rate  of  Crowth0()  Domestic  Saving  to  CDP  Investment  to  CDP  Ratio  of  Exports  to  GDP
1970-80  1981-84  1986-88  1970-80  1981-84  1986-08  1970-80  1981-84  1986-89  1970-80  1981-84  1986-88
EIAL  avege  4.6  (2)  1.3  (3)  4.2  (1)  17.4  (1)  14.8  (1)  17.2  311)  22.5  (2)  19.9  (1)  18.6  (1)  24.2  (2)  25  1 (2)  28.3  (1) :Wdibn  S.6  0.6  3.9'  16.8  14.4  19.3  23.5  20.2  18.6  20.8  22.5  23.2 -1.t  q..ertil  2.5  -0.6  2.3  13.9  10.7  10.9  20.2  16.1  14.9  i8.4  14  5  17.6 -3  d  Q.atri  6.3  2.7  4.1  20.S  20.1  2a.0  25.9  23.7  23.7  29.8  35.0  37.0
OAL  a*verag  3.9  (3)  2.3  (2)  3.0  (2)  1402° (3)  12.7 (2)  13.3  (3)  22.3  (3)  22.0  (2)  20.3  (3)  22.2  (3)  24.4  (3)  23.6  (3) ead.  an  3.6  1.9  3.3  142  12.1  13.  217  19.4  18.4  19. 1  22.3  22.3 -3a  tq.Orti  I  2.7  0.6  1.2  4.7  1.3  4.1  15.0  15.3  13.8  12.8  12.8  12.5  1- -34  q..a,til  4.9  3.9  3.8  21.6  21.6  20.7  26.9  26.7  24.9  28.8  27.9  32.2  0
~4AL  *.eragw  5.5  (1)  3.1 (1)  2.7  (3)  16.7  (2)  14.0  (3)  14.4  (2)  23.4  (1)  24.1  (3)  20.0  (2)  26.3  (1)  26.1  (1  )  24.6  (2) 4.6  2.7  2.2  6.2  14.1  12.2  22.3  23.5  20.0  23.2  24.2  20.8 -SeL  q..arLif  3.6  -0.7  0.a  11.0  6.2  6.2  l8.5  18.  13.6  35.4  13.8  12  1 -3r,  q9..al&t  7.0  5  7  4.1  20.1  21.3  21.3  27.9  28.0  24 .2  32.3  31.1  34.6
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same  exogenous  influences.
The results  are  shown  in  Table  3.  After  explicitly  adjusting  for  the
external  shocks,  initial  conditions,  levels  of external  iinancing,  and
policies  followed  in the  pre-program  period,  the change  in the  annual  average
rate  of GDP growth  in the  ELAL  countries  was higher  but not statistically
different  from  that  of all  the  other  countries  when measuring  changes  between
1970-80  and 1985-88. Between  1981-84  and 1985-88,  however,  adjustment
programs  are estimated  to have  boosted  the  rate  of GDP growth  by close  to 2
percentage  points. The International  Monetary  Fund (IMF)  was also  supporting
Table  3:  The  effectiveness  of adjustment  lending
PerAil  Ciange  in  rate'  Ohnge  n  Change  tn  Change  in
dependent  of  growth  of  CDP  i,vestment/lDP  domestic  saving/  eport/GDP
variabk  (%)  (%)  CDP(%)  (')
Cument  prices
1985
with  1  -4.1"  4.0*  6.4"
1970-80
1985-88




with  1.0  -5.6"  2.0  1.2
1970-80
1985-88
with  1.9"00  -0.1  5.g8  23
1981-84
1. The rate of grvwth of GDP is measured at constant prces In both cases  but the estimatin  procedure requires the use of lagged values of all the
perfotmance Ind1cstam and that is the reason for slghtly different estimation of the effect  of programs on rte  of grwwth  of CDP in the top and bottom
of (ie table.
* Statistically  sirdficant at  the 2.5%  level
Statcally  signlficant at the 5%  leveL
Statistically  sidgnicant at the 7.5%  leveL
StatsdcaUly  aignflcant at the 10%  leveL12
most  of  these  programs.  However,  the  results  of  effectiveness  of  Bank
supported  programs  are  already  adjusted  ror  the  presence  of an IMF  program.5
Typically,  growth  under  the successful  adjustment  programs  usually  improved
the  growth  rate  as a  result  of higher  export  growth,  which  more than  offset
the  contractionary  effects  of the  reform  policies. The less successful
programs  did  not shift  resources  rapidly  enough  from  nontradable  to tradable
activities  to increase  growth,  probably  because  of market  distortions  and
institutional  weaknesses. In some  countries  with severe  macroeconomic
instabi'.ity,  the  programs  supported  by the  initial  adjustment  loans  broke
down,  a situation  that  depressed  growth  in 1985-88.
In the  case of investment,  after  adjusting  for  other  factors,  the
adjustment  programs  appear  to have  led  to a  drop in  the investment  share  in
GDP (in  current  prices)  of 4.1  percentage  points  between  1970-80  and 1985-88.
The decreases  between  1981-84  and 1985-88  were small  and  not statistically
significant. Further,  because  most  EIAL countries  carried  out a  real
depreciation  in 1985-88,  the  relative  price  of investment  goods  rose. As a
result,  the  effect  of the  programs  was an even  larger  average  reduction  --  5.6
percentage  points  of GDP --  in the  constant  price  ratio  of investment  to  GDP
between  1970-80  and 1985-88. Finally,  as compared  with other  countries,  the
different  statistical  techniques  all show  that  countries  with adjustment
programs  had lower  ratios  of investment  to GDP.  This decline  came  not  only
from  lower  public  investment,  but  from  lower  private  investment,  probably
caused  in part  by the  greater  economic  uncertainty  at the  start  of the
adjustment  program.
5  The adjustment  is  made by introducing  a  dummy  variable  that takes  the
value  of one for  countries  with IMF  programs  and  zero,  otherwise.13
The reduction  in  the  rate of  private  investment  may  have been
unavoidable  in the  initial  phase  of the  adjustment  programs  (see  Section  IV).
Under  pressure  to reduce  public  sector  deficits,  many governments
substantially  reduced  their  investment  programs  (and  current  expenditures  for
the  maintenance  of infrastructure)  because  of their  incapacity  to reduce  other
expenditures.  However,  such  reductions  in  public  investment  in infrastructure
and  human  capital  seriously  jeopardized  the  resumption  of private  investment
and  the  ultimate  success  of the  adjustment  programs. On the  other  hand,
expansion  of efficient  public  investment  enhances  the  supply  response  to the
reformed  incentive  structure  by increasing  the  credibility  of the  adjustment
programs  and  thus contributing  to the  expansion  of private  investment.
A decline  in investment  is  worrisome,  since  in  most countries
sustainable  higher  growth  is likely  to require  an increase  in investment  above
the  average  levels  of the  1980s. The  hoped-for  recovery  of investment  to
sustain  future  growth  did  not  occur  in  most  EIAL countries,  although  their
experience  varies  (Table  4).  At the  same  time,  the impact  of the  programs  on
investment  should  be  viewed  with caution. Since  adjustment  is  not estimated
to  have reduced  growth,  it  must have  increased  the  average  efficiency  of
capital. Where  an integral  aim  of the  adjustment  programs  was to  curtail
public  (and  private)  investment  programs  whose  efficiency  was low,  a decrease
in the  rate  of investment  was part  of the  adjustment.
With respect  to the  domestic  saving  rate  in  current  prices,  after
adjusting  for  the  effects  of other  factors,  it increased  more in the  EIAL
countries  than  in other  countries  (Table  3).  (The  domestic  saving  rate  is
more appropriate  than  the  national  saving  rate for  measuring  the  impact  of
adjustment  on resource  mobilization,  because  net factor  payments  abroad  are14
Table 4:  Country differences in performance
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not  deducted  and  net foreign  transfers  are  not included.)'  As a  share  of GDP,
the  domestic  sarving  rate  rose  about  4  pereentage  points  more for  the  EIAL
countries  than for  the  other  countries,  whether  using 1970-80  or 1981-84  as
the  base period.
With respect  to the  ratio  of exRorts  to GD? in current  prices,  after
adjusting  for  other  factors  the  Bank-supported  programs  had a  positive
effect,  boosting  it  about  6.4  percentage  points  of GDP  between  1970-80  and
1985-88  and  5.0  percentage  points  between  1985-88,  although  with large
differences  across  countries. The strong  positive  effect  of the  programs  on
the  ratio  of exports  to  GDP in  current  prices  could  be in part the  result  of
the  accounting  effect  of real  devaluations  by the  EIAL countries  in the  third
period. As to the  ratio  of exports  to GDP in  constant  prices  after
controlling  for  other  factors,  the  adjustment  programs  on average  had  a
positive,  although  not statistically  significant,  effect  (Table  3).
The low  and statistically  insignificant  effect  on the ratio  of exports
to GDP in constant  prices  raises  concerns  about  the  speed  of the  supply
response  of exports  to the  changed  incentives  brought  about  by a  real
devaluation. The small  and  slow  average  response  may  be accounted  for  by the
absence  of the investment  needed  to increase  supply  and  by uncertainties  about
the  stability  of the  improved  incentives  for  exports. For countries  with a
long  history  of  macroeconomic  instability,  with discrimination  against
'  The  effect  of the  programs  on  the  national  saving  rate is  also  positive
but is statistically  significant  at the 5 percent level  only when comparing
performance  in 1981-84  with 1985-88.16
exports,  and  with unstable  real  exchange  rates,  the  export  response  would  be
low.,
In terms  of the  ratio  of imports  to GDP in  current  prices,  the
structural  adjustment  programs  in  the  EIAL  countries  had a  small  negative
effect  of 1.7  percentage  points  from  1970-80  to 1985-88,  and  a small  positive
effect  of 1.3  percentage  points  from  1981-84  to 1985-88.8  Given  that in some
countries  output  has  been constrained  by a lack  of imports,  the improved
access  to imported  inputs  may in part  have led  to the  increase  in the
efficiency  of investment  between  1981-84  and 1985-88  by permitting  fuller  use
of productive  capacity.
The  macroeconomic  performance  of intensive-adjustment-lending  countries
has thus  been at least  adequate  on the  dimensions  of GDP  growth,  saving,
exports,  and  imports,  with the  very strong  performance  of some  countries  more
than  making  up for  the  declines  witnessed  in others. In the area  of
investment,  however,  aggregate  performance  has  been  poor.  Behind  this average
results  there  are important  differences  across  countries. Table  4 reports
result  of country  performance  for  each  indicator  after  adjusting  for  other
facts.
B.  The  Effectiveness  of  _,diustment  Programs--Social  Welfare  Indicators
Aggregate  economic  performance  does  not tell  the  whole  story  of the
effect  of structural  adjustment. It is important  also to consider  what
I  On the role  of incentives  and  uncertainty  on exports,  see  R. Caballero
and  V. Corbo,  (1989).
8  This  result  comes  from  the  identity  that  investment  minus  saving  equals
imports  minus  exports.17
happened  to indicators  of consumption,  especially  by the  poorest  level  of
society,  and  what happened  in the  education  and  health  sectors.
In countries  with an  unsustainable  current  account  deficit,  the
macroeconomic  component  of the  adjustment  programs  encourages  a reduction  in
aggregate  demand,  generally  through  monetary  and  fiscal  restraint. It also
encourages  switching  production  from  the  nontradable  to the  tradable  sectors,
generally  through  a real  devaluation. The reductions  in  aggregate  demand  are
likely  to have  negative  short-run  effects  on the  growth  of output  and
employment. On the  other  hand,  the  structural  reforms  (economy-wide  and
sector-specific)  improve  the  efficiency  of the  economy,  have a longer  term
positive  impact  on the  growth  of output,  and  are likely  to reduce  poverty  in
the  medium  to longer  run. That is,  while  the  reduction  in aggregate  demand
and the  structural  reforms  are  bound  to  have distributional  consequences,  the
potential  adverse  short-run  effects  must  be weighed  against  the  longer  run
benefits.
In countries  with high  inflation,  policies  that  permanently  reduce  the
fiscal  deficit  make a  major  contribution  to the  reduction  of inflation. Lower
inflation  should  help  the  poor,  who are  less  able  to protect  the  real  value  of
their  assets  and incomes  from  inflation. Lowering  the fiscal  deficit  requires
a combination  of revenue  increases  and  expenditure  cuts.  On the  revenue  side,
higher  income  taxes  generally  do  not affect  the  poor,  and the  goods  they
consume  can  be exempted  from  excise  taxes. As to expenditures,  whether  the
decreases  will affect  the  poor  depends  on the incidence  of the  cuts.  For
example,  reductions  in health  spending  could  have a  negative  impact. If,
however,  the composition  of health  expenditures  were to switch  toward
preventive  medicine  and  away  from  curative  medicine,  which  goes  mainly  to the
middle  class,  the  impact  on the  poor  could  be softened.18
As to structural  reforms,  changes  in relative  prices  that  remove  the
biases  against  labor  should  help reduce  poverty  in the long  run.  Devaluation
of the  exchange  rate  will  help the  poor if the)  -roduce  tradable  goods  and
will hurt them if they  consume  tradable  goods,  such  as  imported  necessities.
Removal  of the  ceilings  on agricultural  prices  will  benefit  the  rural  poort
who are  net producers  of food,  but  hurt the  urban  poor,  who are  net consumers
of food.
It is difficult  to assess  the  effects  of adjustment  programs  on the  poor
for  three  reasons. First,  it is inherently  difficult  to establish  causality
--  to isolate  the  effects  of adjustment  programs  from  other  factors  --  and
particularly  to determine  whether  alternative  policies  would  have done  better
or  worse.  Second,  socioeconomic  data  on the living  conditions  of the  poor are
scarce  and  often  of dubious  quality. Although  many  of the  poor  work in the
informal  sector,  data  on the  output  of that  sector  and  on other  variables  are
usually  not included  in official  statistics. Third,  adjustment  programs  are
relatively  new,  and their  long-run  positive  effects  probably  take  longer  than
the  experience  with adjustment  so far.
At the  same  time,  while  a  complete  analysis  of  adjustment  programs  must
await  the conclusion  of the  entire  adjustment  period,  interim  evaluations  such
as those  here are  still  necessary.'  In  general,  the  limited  cross-sectional
data  on changes  in  poverty  do not  suggest  that  adjustment  lending  has  on
average  increased  poverty. Furthermore,  aggregate  data support  similar
conclusions:
I  The  central  topic  of  World  Development  Report  1990,  World  Bank (1990)  is
poverty. This report  includes  additional  analyses  of the  impact  of adjustment
programs  on poverty.19
*  On average,  the  rate of  growth  of private  consumption  ir the  EIAL
countries  recovered  in the  late 1980S  to the  rate  achieved  in the 1970C
--  and  the rate  in the  late 19809  was  higher  in total  and  on a  per
capita  basis  in  comparison  with other  groups  of countries.
*  The socioectaomic  indicators  of the  status  of the  poor in developing
countries  or in the  EIAL group  did  not deteriorate  in the 19809  on
average. The indicators  of nutrition  improved,  and average  protein
intake  continued  to rise from  1983-84  to 1986  in all  categories  of
countries,  with and  without  adjustment  lending. Infant  and child
mortality,  indicators  of the  longer  run  health  status  of the  poor,
continued  to improve  on averag=  for  country  categories  with and  without
adjustment  lending.
*  Data on health  and  education  point  to the  deterioration  of the situation
of the  poor.  The  shares  of central  government  expenditures  for  health
and education  declined  on average  iu the  EIAL  countries  having  data.
Some of the  decline  may have  occurred  because  better  targeting  of public
expenditures  left  middle-  and  upper-income  groups  paying  for  more of the
provision  of  these  services  or because  other  levels  of government  took
responsibility  for  some  of these  expenditures.  In education,  there  were
declining  rates  of primary  school  enrollment  for  the  EIAL  countries.
This trend  is inconsistent  with restoring  sustainable  long-term  growth,
which requires  strengthening  the  human  capital  base,  an important  input
in  growth. In health,  the  coverage  of immunization  generally  increased
in all country  groups,  a  trend  that  probably  accounts  for  much of the
continuing  decline  in the  rates  of infant  and child  mortality.20
C.  Program  Implementation
The data  set  on conditionality  and implementation,  with a  much expanded
sample  of loans  approved  in FY79-88,  showed  most of the  same  patterns  found  in
the  fir-st  Report,  and  revrealed  some  new  ones (Webb  and  Shariff,  1990).
Countries  begin  implementing  their  structural  adjustment  program  before  the
adjustment  loans  become  effective  and frequently  continue  implementation  after
disbursement  ends.  Progress  in implementation  is  measured  by the share  of
conditions  in the loan  agreements  that  have  been implemented  by the time  of
final  tranche  release. Of all  conditions  in the  loan  agreements  in the
sample,  84 percent  had  been implemented  at least  substantially  --  better  than
found  in the  first  Report  --  and 66 percent  had  beeen  implemented  fully  or
more than fully  by the  time  of final  tranche  release.
Implementation  rates  increased  during  the 1980s,  both for  countries  that
had received  adjustment  loans  since  the  early  1980s  and for  countries  that
started  more recently. For the  loans  in the  sample  that  had final  tranche
release  in FY89,  i.e.,  since  the  first  Report,  99  percent  of the  conditions
were implemented  at least  substantially,  and  80 percent  of the  conditions  as
originally  written  were implemented  fully  or  more.  In the  rare  cases  when a
condition  as originally  written  does  not seem  necessary,  the  Bank  waives  the
condition,  with approval  from  the  Board. Not counting  the  one  loan in the
sample  for  which  this occurred  in FY89,  this  would raise  the  proportion  of
fully  implemented  conditions  from  80 to  88 percent. Thus,  the final  tranches
were released  only  when all  conditions  in  the loans  were at least
substantially  fulfilled. Implementation  rates  are lower  for  countries  with
higher  rate  of inflation. This  finding  illustrates  the importance  of
macroeconomic  stability  once  again.21
Governments  have  been  more frequently  able to develop  and  maintain
political  support  for  structural  adjustment  when the  program  was designed  with
this  aim in  mind and  when the  government  was active  in  explaining  the  source
of the  problems  addressed  by the  program,  how it  planned  to tackle  them,  why
this  was the  best  option,  and  how  people  would  benefit  from  the  new  policy
environment. Mobilizing  beneficiaries  to become  political  supporters  usually
follows. While  technical  considerations  sometimes  cause  unavoidable  delays  in
program  implementation,  more  prompt  implementation  almost  always  increases  the
chances  of political  support. Awareness  of the  economic  problems  that
motivated  the  initial  decision  for  reform  will be strongest  at the  beginning,
giving  the  authorities  maximum  latitude  for  reform. The  support  for
sustaining  the  new status  quo  then  develops  as structural  reform  pays off  in
growth  and  higher  living  standards.
Although  adjustment  programs  often  call for  a reduction  of resources
going  into  the  public  sector,  it is equally  important  to strengthen  public
institutions  through  improved  policies,  organization,  and  management.
Institutional  development  is essential  for  both the  implementation  and  the
ultimate  success  of many of the  reforms  the  Bank supports.
IV. MAIN RESULTS  OF RAL-2:  POLICIES  THAT  PROMOTE  GROWTH
The Report  on Adiustment  Lendina  - II not  only  evaluated  the
effectiveness  of adjustment  lending  in the  past,  but  also  provided  a summary
of the  relevant  research  on  what policies  promote  sustainable  growth. The
policies  to increase  investment,  saving,  and the  rate  of increase  of
efficiency  would,  of course,  be prime  candidates  for  inclusion  in structural
adjustment  programs.22
In theory,  adjustment  measures  should  boost  investment,  particularly  in
the  tradable  goods  sector. The increase  in investment  will provide  a
connection  between  adjustment,  growth,  and  external  balance  that  will ensure
the  sustainability  of the  adjustment  effort. The  reason,  of course,  is that
structural  adjustment  programs  change  an economy's  incentives  to increase
efficiancy  and  encourage  growth. Given  the  pivotal  role  of increased
investment  in the  recovery  of sustained  growth,  adjusting  countries  will need
to institute  further  policy  reforms  in the  later  phases  of adjustment  to
restore  adequate  levels  of investment.  This section  looks  at  why adjustment
programs  have constrained  investment  and then  suggests  further  policy  reforms
adjusting  countries  will need  to  make to achieve  sustainable  growth.
Specifically,  they  must address  the  uncertainty  and lack  of credibility  that
often  accompany  adjustment  programs  and  deter  investors,  they  must foster
higher  rates  of saving  by both  the  public  and  private  sectors,  and they  must
increase  the  efficiency  of investment  by removing  distortions.
A.  Increasing  Investment
To understand  what policies  are  needed  to increase  investment,  it is
useful  to  understand  why it  declined  so frequently  during  adjustment. One
reason  for  the slow  investment  response  to structural  adjustment  programs  is
investor  uncertainty  about  governments'  commitment  to carry  the  programs
through. That is,  the  adjustment  programs  lacked  credibility. Private  agents
may also  receive  mixed  incentive  signals  --  some  associated  with the  previous
policy  rules,  some  with the stabilization  package,  and some  with the
structural  reforms  aimed  at restoring  medium-term  growth. This  uncertainty
about  the future  economic  environment,  particularly  the incentive  structure,
leaves  investors  reluctant  to make fixed  investments,  as for  the  most part3
they  are irreversible;  capital,  once  installed,  can seldom  be put  to
productive  uses in a different  activity,  at least  not  without  incurring  a
i  substantial  cost.  Thus,  a trade  reform  that  is suspected  of being  only
temporary  can neduce  investment,  as economic  agents  postpone  their  investment
decisions  while  waiting  to see  whether  the  reform  lasts  (Serven  and  Solimano,
1990).
The  opposite  is  also true,  however; investment  may  be furthered  by a
stable  and  predictable  incentive  structure  and  macroeconomic  policies,  even
more so than  by tax incentives  or subsidized  interest  rates. Under  conditions
of great  economic  and  political  uncertainty,  making  tax  and  related  incentives
high enough  to have any  significant  impact  on investment  is  usually
prohibitively  expensive. 10 In  Argentina,  Honduras,  Morocco,  and even  Turkey,
investment  incentives  substantially  enlarged  government  deficits  without
appreciably  increasing  investment.
Investment  also  declined  because  of the  reduced  availability  of
financing. Lower  external  financing  forced  an important  decline  in the
deficit  in the  resource  balance  --  defined  as the  difference  between  domestic
investment  and domestic  saving  --  following  the  debt crisis  in  1982 (Table  5).
Because  this  decline  was  not  matched  by a sufficient  incraase  in domestic
saving,  the  deficit  was almost  entirely  reflected  in reduced  investment.
The  demand  for  investment  fell for  several  reasons. For  one,  public
investment  contracted  because  in some  cases  it  was  unsustainably  high and  of
dubious  productivity.  Other  reasons  were the  deterioration  in fiscal
conditions  as a result  of the  cut in foreign  lending  and  the  lack  of
adjustment  in other  fiscal  expenditures,  the  rise in international  and
'° See  R. Pindyck  (1989).24
domestic  interest  rates,  and the  sharp  acceleration  of irnflation,  which  eroded
real tax  receipts. In the  case  of private  investment,  slower  or even  negative
growth  discouraged  it in several  countries,  as did the  adverse  external
shocks,  the  uncertainty  about  the  new configuration  of relative  prices  and
incentives,  and  the inability  of governments  to stabilize  their  economies. In
addition,  the  debt  overhang  may  have  discouraged  investment  not only  through
the  uncertainty  it created  bu.  also  through  its  implicit  "tax"  on future
output  and the  resultant  credit  rationing  in the  international  capital
markets.
Uncertainty  and lack  of credibility  often  undermine  the  effectiveness  of
macroeconomic  policy. There  are  two  aspects  to credibility: the internal
consistency  of the adjustment  program;  and  the  government9s  commitment  to
carry  it out  despite  possible  short-run  costs. When credibility  is low,  and
the  investment  response  is therefore  insufficient  to restore  growth,  a
structural  adjustment  program  may entail  larger-than-anticipated  social  and
economic  costs."'  A persistent  slump  may develop  before  investors  become
confident  that  the  adjustment  measures  vill  be maintained. Resolving  the
problem  of a low  investment  response  may be particularly  critical  for
economies  with a history  of frequent  policy  swings  or failed  stabilization
attempts. As the  recent  experiences  of Bolivia  and  Mexico  show,  while
establishing  the  right  economic  incentives  is a  precondition  for  investment
and growth,  it cannot  guarantee  them. 
12
"  Credibility  introduces  an externality  that  creates  a  wedge  between  the
social  and  private  returns  on investment.  In  fact,  higher  aggregate  investment
helps sustain the adjustment and therefore results in higher returns on
investment. However,  the  individual  investor  will ignore  this  mechanism.
12  See  R. Dornbusch  (1989).25
Any assessment  of credibility  and  uncertainty  should  Influence  the  choice
between  gradual  and  abrupt  adjustment.  Under  gradual  adjustment,  the  initial
objectives  are  modest  ones that  can  be achieved  with  near certainty,  so that
the  goverment can  build  its  reputation. However,  gradual  adjustment  may
build  up resistance  to change. Abrupt  adjustment  starts  with an
overadjustment  --  say,  an overdepreciation  of the  exchange  rate  accompanied  by
large  cuts in tariffs  --  the  aim  being  to frontload  the  incentives  for
resource  reallocation. However,  this approach  also  concentrates  the  costs  of
the adjustment." 3 The  choice  appears  to depend  largely  on the specifics  of
each  country,  with the  social  distribution  of the adjustment  costs  and  policy
experience  likely  to be important  factors.
Sufficient  external  support  for  the  adjustment  effort  of a committed
government  can  raise  the  confidence  of investors  in  the oustainability  of the
adjustment  and  thus enhance  the  takeoff  of investment. Implementation  of
well-targeted  public  investment  projects  that  attract  private  investment  may
be another  important  element  in getting  growth  under  way.
The implementation  of  well-targeted  public  investment  projects  in
infrastructure  which  complement,  rather  than  compete  with private  investment
can  get growth  under  way by attracting  private  investment. Institutional
reforms  and  the  correction  of microeconomic  distortions  can  also  play  an
important  role  in the  recovery  of investment  by facilitating  the  private
sector's  access  to factor  and financial  markets,  improving  its  entrepreneurial
Is On these  topics,  see  M. Kiguel  and  N. Liviatan  (1988);  and  A. Solimano
(1990).26
capabilities,  and  making  the legal  and  regulatory  framework  more conducive  for
business.14
B.  Jncreagsing  Savinat
To sustain  investment  for  a desirable  rate  of growth,  the  adjusting
countries  have to increase  their  rate  of saving.  This  need is greatest  in the
highly  indebted  countries,  mostly  in  Latin  America  and in  Sub-Saharan  Africa,
whose saving  rates  fell  significantly  in the  1980.  (Table  5).
Although  public  policies  can  affect  public  saving  directly,  there  are
limits  to their  effect  on private  saving. Public  saving  and  the  way it is
financed  affect  the  economic  environment  --  GDP  growth  and  inflation  --  and
Table  5:  Gross  domestic  and  national  saving  ratios  in 83 developing  countries
Inda2trlrgqi  1970480  1981484 1985-8
Gross  domestic savinglGDP
Total  0.15  0.12  0.13
Africa  0.11  0.06  0.08
Asia  0.19  0.19  0.21
Europe/Middle  East/
North Africa  0.15  0.16  0.15
Latin America and
CAribbean  020  0.17  0.17
Gross national saving/GNP
Total  0.14  0.10  0.10
Afrtca  0.11  0.06  0.06
Asia  0.18  0.18  0.19
Europe/Middle East/
North Africa  0.15  0.14  0.12
Latin America and
Caribbean  0.17  0.12  0.11
Note: Data  were  not avaiable  for Guinea.  Hunpary,  Mozanbique,
Poland, and Yemen  PDR.
a. In a few cues, t988  data  were  unavailable;  for them,  the 1987
saving ratios were assumed.
Source: ANDREX  database, World Bank
14  For  a thorough  discussion  of these  issues,  see  World  Bank (1989a);  see
also  G.M.  Meier  and  W.F.  Steel,  eds., (1989).27
this  environment  in  turn affects  decisions  on private  saving. That is,  public
and  private  saving,  although  analyzed  separately  here,  are  closely  linked.
To measure  public  saving  properly  requires  defining  the  public  sector
comprehensively  as encompassing  central  and  local  governments,  financial  and
nonfinancial  public  enterprises,  and  the  quasi-fiscal  operations  of the
central  bank.  In  many countries,  the  losses  of public  enterprises  have
contributed  to the  high  public  deficits. In Bolivia,  public  enterprise
deficits  reached  5 percent  of  GDP  before  the 1987  stabilization.  In
Argentina,  they  have fluctuated  between  2 percent  and 7  percent  since  the
early  19809. In Zimbabwe,  they  were reduced  from  9 percent  of GDP  in 1982  to
4 percent  in 1988.  In some  countries,  the  losses  of the  central  bank  have
been even  more important  than the  deficit  of the  general  government  or the
public  enterprises. Often  these  losses  have resulted  from  quasi-fiscal
operations  such  as emergency  loans  at subsidized  rates  to failing  domestic
financial  systems  and  from foreign  exchange  subsidies  to domestic  holders  of
foreign  debt.  In  Argentina  the  central  bank's  losses  have fluctuated  between
2 percent  and 6  percent  of GDP  since  1982,  while in Chile  they  were 7  percent
of GDP  in 1985  and  in  Venezuela  6 percent  of GDP in 1987.`
Changes  in the  public  sector  deficit  and  in public  saving  result  not only
from  the  direct  effects  of tax  and  expenditure  policies  but also  from  the
interaction  of fiscal  policy  with other  policies  and  with foreign  economic
shocks.1"  For example,  depreciation  of the  exchange  rate  affects  all  budget
items  that  are  fixed  in foreign  currencies  or indexed  to  world  prices. A real
"  V. Corbo  and  K. Schmidt-Hebbel  (forthcoming).
16  Public  saving  and the  deficit  are  directly  linked: the  public  deficit
is defined  as  public  investment  minus  public  saving.28
depreciation  increases  the  budget  deficit  (relative  to GDP)  when the  public
sector  has  more expenses  than  revenues  denominated  in foreign  currencies  --  as
in countries  where the  foreign  debt  service  is  a large  part  of public  spending
(e.g.,  Brazil,  Philippines,  and  Turkey). In countries  where  the  public  sector
obtains  much revenue  from  import  taxes  or commodity  exports  --  oil in  Mexico,
phosphates  in  Morocco,  and  copper  in Zambia  --  a real depreciation  tends  to
decrease  the  budget  deficit.
In  most countries  the  bulk  of saving  is  accounted  for  by the  private
sector. While  government  policy  can  readily  alter  the  disposable  income  of
the  private  sector,  in a  market  economy  it has  only  limited  influence  on the
share  of disposable  income  that  the  private  sector  saves. Key  policies  that
affect  private  saving  are the  rate  of return  on saving,  the level  and  form  of
taxation,  the  rate  of inflation,  the  real  exchange  rate,  the flight  of
capital,  the  business  cycle,  the  inflows  of foreign  capital,  and  the  rate  of
growth  (Table  6).
Credit  rationing  and  controls  on interest  rates  discourage  saving  in  many
countries. The  low  or negative  real  interest  rates  on deposits  and
targeted  credits  reduce  the supply  of loanable  funds  and  hence  effectively
ration  investment." Financial  reforms  that  raise  real  interest  rates  to
market  clearing  levels  are  justified  because  they  improve  the  efficiency  of
resource  use,  which  boosts  long-run  growth.  I  The  effect  of higher  real
interest  rates  on the  level  of private  saving  is  ambiguous,  however. The
17  For a recent  review  of financial  systems  and financial  liberalization
in developing  countries,  see  World  Bank (1989b).
i6  This policy  prescription  is taken from R. McKinnon (1973);  and E.S.
Shaw (1973).29
Table  6s  Public  policy  and  private  saving:  effects  of intervening  variables
Aftat  Per  cpita disp.  fgwo
Infflaian  11 Prtet  Foreg
wid rdatlal  of ram  on  Deviat  i  resowe  Incma,  OCpital  Total  ect
p,  setabfity  savin  Growth  Trend  from trend  constraint  concentrat.  flight  on saing
Effect  of an inrease in
interverdng  vadiable  - +  +  +  +  - +
on private  saving
Policy
Flnandal  Uberalizatlon  ?  +  +  + ?
(Lrun)  nrun)
FLscal/monetary  +  ?  +  +  +
stabilization  (Lnu)  (Lrun)  (Sxnm)  (L mn)
Selective  tax incentives  +?  +
on partcula  finandal
assets
Shift  of taxation  fom  +  +
corporadons  to
houeholds
Shift  of txation from  +  +
higher  to lower  income
houeholds
Shift  fom income  to  +  t
consumption  tax
Real  exchange  rate  +  +  +
depredation  (Lrw')  (Srun)  (L run)
Foreign  capital Inflows  +
(Lrun)
Note The agm  in the  BUnt  line  hndicate  the  effet of the  inteveing  varlable  oh  private  saving,  while  the  *sg  in the rmainder  of the  table
denote  the  fiscal  effect  of each  pulcy  rug  the  coresponding  ltewevltig  variable.  For  detild  SCsio  of the effects,  aee text
reason  is  that  an increase  in the  real  return  on saving  has two offsetting
effects. First,  a  higher  real interest  rate  decreases  the  present  cost of
future  consumption,  so that  it is  attractive  to consume  less  now and  more in
the future  and  thus to save  more today. Second,  it is  no longer  necessary  to
save  as  much  to achieve  a target  level  of future  consumption. A higher  real
interest  rate  therefore  allows  greater  consumption  both today  and tomorrow  and
reduces  the  need to save  today.
Given  this  theoretical  ambiguity,  the  effect  of the real interest  rate  on
saving  becomes  an empirical  issue.  A large  body of evidence  for  both30
industrial  and  developing  countries  shows  that,  on average,  real  interest
rates  or after-tax  real  rates  of return  do  not  have a significant  effect  on
the  share  of private  income  that is savedt9  However,  financial  liberalization
that  allows  real interest  rates  to rebound  from  very  negative  to near-zero
levels  often  has a  positive  impact  on  measured  private  saving  in financially
unstable,  high-inflation  countries.  This  effect  is attributable
to reduced  flight  into  consumer  durables  and  foreign  assets  after  the  interest
rate  has risen.
Public  policies  to raise  public  saving  and  hence  national  saving  have a
key  role in structural  adjustment. The evidence  shows  that the  private  sector
does  not reduce  its  saving  one-for-one  with tax  increases  or public  spending
cuts;  it follows  that  reductions  in  budget  deficits  increase  national  saving.
This  fact  has  profound  implications  for  Bank-supported  adjustment  lending. It
was  concluded  earlier  in Section  III  that  after  controlling  for  the  effect  of
other  factors,  the  domestic  saving  rate  rose  4 percentage  points  more in  EIAL
countries  than in  any other  group  of countries. Thus,  adjustment  programs
supported  by the  Bank  have played  a significant  role in  raising  aggregate
domestic  saving  and  changing  its  composition  in favor  of public  saving.
C.  Increasing  Investment  Efficiency
Resources  for investment  are  scarce,  and  it is therefore  vital  to
increase  the  efficiency  of investment. Further,  because  more efficient
investment  has  a higher  rate  of return,  increasing  the  efficiency  of
19  Among  the  studies presenting growing evidence on  the  interest
insensitivity  of  saving  in  developing  countries  see,  for  instance,  A.  Giovannini,
(1985).  For an alternative  view, see  M.J. Fry (1988),  and the survey  by B.
Balassa  (1989).31
investment  encourages  savings  to stay  in the  developing  economy  and  not to go
into  capital  flight.
Investment  is  more efficient  with relatively  nondistortionary  policies*
and  therefore  policy  changes  that  reduce  the  distortions  in resource
allocation  not only raise  the  baseline  level  of efficiency  but also  tend  to
raise  growth  in the long  term.  The  size  of the initial  distortions  and  the
magnitude  of the  reduction  affect  how  much growth  will respond. Growth-
enhancing  policies  include  lowering  tariffs,  relaxing  import  quotas,  raising
or decontrolling  domestic  interest  rates,  reducing  reserve  requirements  or
mandatory  government  bondholdings,  reducing  government  subsidies  for
consumption  or production  of particular  goods,  and  reforming  taxes  to reduce
or eliminate  differential  treatment  of sectors  or inputs.
Reforms  to improve  incentives  can  proceed  in several  steps. For example,
tariffs  can  initially  be substituted  for  quotas,  both  to increase  the
transparency  of incentives  and to raise  public  revenue. Later,  tariffs  can  be
reduced  as other  revenue  sources  are  expanded. Institutional  development  may
be necessary  to strengthen  the  private  responses  to such  changes  in
incentives. In low-income  countries,  the  lack  of  well-developed  public  and
private  institutions  may  be an important  hindrance  to growth  even  if trade  and
financial  incentives  are  not distorted. A stable  system  of civil  liberties,
well-defined  property  and contractual  rights,  and  predictable  and equitable
regulation  are  widely  believed  to be particularly  important  in harnessing  the
energies  of entrepreneurs  in  Africa. 20 A comparison  of the  long-run  growth
experience  among  many developing  countries  concluded  that govenments'
administrative  competence  was the  single  most important  factor  explaining  the
20  World Bank (1989b).32
differences  in growth. 2"  Political  stability  and  the  safeguarding  of civil
liberties  have also  been found  to increase  growth. 22
An important  finding  of our  research  is that  the  largest  payoff  comes
from  changing  high  distortions  into  low  ones.  Neither  a small  reduction  in
high  distortions  nor the  complete  removal  of small  distortions  does  much to
foster  higher  growth  in the  long  run,  a conclusion  that is  based  on
examination  of country  experience  and simulation  of a structural  model  of
growth. Since  policymakers  have  only  a limited  amount  of political  capital
for  correcting  distortions,  they  should  concentrate  their  efforts  on the
changes  that  have the  largest  payoff  in increased  growth  rates.  If  more than
one  major  distortion  exists,  all  should  be reduced  together.
V.  LESSONS  FOR  EASTERN  EUROPE  OF OTHER  REFORM  EXPERIENCES
In this section  we draw  some  lessons  for  the design  of progroipjs  in
Eastern  Europe  from  the  experience  with adjustment  program  elsewhere. The
evidence  that  we use is drawn  from  both successful  and  unsuccessful  reforms.
Although  initial  conditions  are  not the  same  in all the  Eastern  European
countries,  some  common  elements  exist. At the  cost  of simplification  the
general  characteristics  are  the  following: (1)  large  excess  demand  at
existing  prices. This  is especially  the  case in  Bulgaria,  Romaniag  and  until
recently  in  Poland. Excess  demand  is less  severe  in Czechoslovakia,  Hungary,
and  Yugoslavia. (2)  large  external  debt  and  unsustainable  balance  of payments
situation,  with the  exception  of  Romania  and  Czechoslovakia.  A large  part  of
21  G. Lloyd  Reynolds  (1985).
22  R. C. Kormendi  and  P. G. Mcguire  (1985);  Gerald  Scully  (June  1988).33
their  international  trade  takes  place  at non-market  terms.  (3)  At the
structural  level  most of the  countries  have a  structure  of industry,  dominated
by large  state  enterprises,  that  is  uncompetitive  at international  prices;
they  lack labor,  land  and financial  markets,  and  the  whole  set  of institutions
needed  to support  a  market  economy  (especially  appropriate  accounting
procedures,  property  rights,  bankruptcy  laws,  and commercial  law).  However,
Eastern  European  countries  have the  big  advantage  that  they start  with a  very
good  human  capital  base,  are  next to one  of the  most dynamic  international
markets (Western  Europe),  and  have a  privileged  political  relation  with the
Western  European  governments. 23
For countries  that  start  with acute  macroeconomic  imbalances  in the  form
of high  open  or repressed  inflation  and/or  unsustainable  current  account
deficits,  stabilization  has to be initiated  at the  beginning  of the  adjustment
program. For  countries  with a  history  of increasingly  binding  price  controls,
stabilization  has  two  components; first,  the  elimination  of the  money
overhang  (a  stock  problem)  and second  the  elimination  of the  public  sector
deficit  (a  flow  problem). The  elimination  of the  money  overhang  can  be done
through  a  once  and  for  all increase  in  the  price  level  or through  a  monetary
reform. Coming  out  of  World  War II  most European  countries  used the  route  of
monetary  reform  to get  rid  of the  monetary  overhang  (Dornbusch  and  Wolf 1990).
However,  most of the  post 1950's  experience  has  been  focused  on the
elimination  of the  money  overhand  through  an increase  of the  price  level.
Countries  with a large  money  overhand  run  the  risk  that  the initial
increase  in the  price  level  could  result  in  a protracted  period  of high
inflation. Even after  taking  care  of the fiscal  adjustment,  some  countries
23  For  a  good  description  of  the  initial  conditions  in  the  Eastern  European
countries,  including  social  and  political  factors,  see  Lipton  and  Sachs  (1990).34
have found  it  very difficult  to contain  the  inflation  dynamic  that  usually
develops  following  the initial  increase  in the  price  level. For example,
Chile  liberalized  prices  in  1973,  however  in spite  of reaching  a public  sector
surplus  by 1975,  three  digit  inflation  lasted  until 1977  (Corbo  and  Solimano,
1990). Most of the  expenditure  reduction  has  to be done through  fiscal  policy
as  monetary  policy  does  not  have  much  of a role  in countries  without  capital
markets  and  where the  main borrowers  are  public  enterprises  without  a  hard
budget  constraint  (Chile  1973,  Mexico  1983,  Egypt  1990).
In countries  where  there  is limited  flexibility  in the  labor  market,  to
break  the  inflation  inertia  that  could  follow  the  liberalization  of prices,
the  drastic  reduction  in the  public  sector  deficit  needs  to be followed  by
some  kind  of income  policy.24  This  was the route  followed  by Israel  in  1985,
Mexico  in 1987  and  Poland  in 1990. To avoid  a prolonged  period  of inflation,
a  permanent  reduction  in  the  public  sector  deficit  should  be done early  on in
the  reform  process. A permanent  reduction  in the  public  sector  deficit
requires  the  imposition  of a hard  budget  constraint  on public  enterprises,  a
drastic  reduction  in public  sector  subsidies,  and the  creation  of an efficient
tax system.  A negative  lesson  is to avoid  the  temptation  of using  onlv  the
nominal  exchange  rate  to bring  a stubborn  inflation  under  control.  The  real
appreciation  that  could  develop  could  put in  jeopardy  the  full  reform  effort
(as  in Chile  in 1978-1982,  Mexico  in 1988-89,  Israel  in 1986-88,  Argentina  in
1978-80,  Uruguay  in 1980-1982).
Socialist  countries  in transition  to a  market  economy  and  heavy  regulated
economies  in  Africa  and  in countries  like  Turkey  (1980),  Chile  (1973),  Mexico
24  Inertia  can result  also from lack  of credibility  or lagged  indexation
schemes.  The latter  form  of inertia  played  a central  role in the slow pace of
inflation  deceleration  of Chile  in 1978-1982  (  Corbo,  1985).35
(1982),  also face  the  problem  of how to  reduce  large  distortions  in relative
prices,  as well as the  distortions  resulting  from  heavily  regulated  or almost
non-existing  labor  and  financial  markete.  On top  of these  distortions,  there
6xists  the  additional  burden  of a  large  public  enterprise  sector  with low
response  to price  incentives,  and a  lack  of institutions  to  manage
macroeconomic  policies  and  establish  a  minimum  set  of rules  for  the  normal
functioning  of a  market  economy  (i.e.  property  rights,  bankruptcy  laws,
appropriate  accounting  procedures  etc.).
For a country  that is  about  to initiate  a  major reform  effort,  the
question  that  has to be faced  from  the  beginning  is the  sequence  and speed  of
other  reforms. Any reform  that  calls  for  a  major  reallocation  of resources
will need to deal  with appropriate  and  credible  relative  prices  early  on.  In
countries that have much to gain from an  integration  in  the world economy,
like  Mexico  (1982),  Chile  (1973)  and the  Eastern  European  countries  todayp
trade  reforms  have a  very  high priority. The initial  stages  of a trade
reform,  such  as the replacement  of  managed  trade  by open  trade,  the
replacement  of QR'e for  tariffs,  and  the  reduction  of extreme  tariffs,  should
be attempted  early  in  the  reform  procese.  However,  major  trade  liberalization
should  be attempted  only  when clear  and  credible  progress  has been  achieved  in
reducing  inflation  or when there  is a clear  perceived  commitment  from  the
authorities  that  the  anti-inflationary  program  has a  very high  priority.  In
countries  with a  very uncompetitive  domestic  economy,  trade  liberalization  may
help  the stabilization  effort,  as could  be the case  of  Mexico  (1988)  and
Poland  (1990),  however,  a  major  fiscal  adjustment  is necessary  to generate
appropriate  spending  reduction  and to avoid  a  balance  of  payments  crisis.
Trade  reforms  aim  to shift  investment  and labor  from  nontradable  and
highly  protected  Import  competing  activities  toward  the  export  oriented  and36
efficient  import-competing  activities.  But  unpredictable  relative  prices  (as
is usually  the  case in  high inflation  economies),  lack  of labor  mobility,  lack
of financial  markets,  and impediments  to the  creation  of enterprises  are  major
roadblocks  to a successful  trade  reform.  Therefore  in  many of the  Eastern
European  countries  privatization  and the  emergence  of new  private  firms  could
be an important  component  of the  economic  restructuring  program.
A major  study  of trade  liberalization  (Choksi,  Michaely  and  Papageorgiou
1990)  found  that  countries  that  carried  out  and  sustained  trade  reforms
usually  had lower  fiscal  deficits  and  inflation  than  countries  where
liberalization  failed. In some cases,  successful  trade  liberalization  was
carried  cuit  t.3-ile  stabilization  was  still  under  way--as  in  Chile  in 1974-79
and  Turke%  in 1980-84. In more typical  cases,  either  severe  macroeconomic
instability  contributed  to the  failure  of the  stabilization  (Argentina,  Brazil
and  Sri-Lanka  in the  1960's,  and  Peru,  Philippines,  Portugal,  Turkey,  and
Uruguay  in the  1970's)  or stability  contributed  to successful  liberalization
(Greece,  Korea,  and Spain  plus  all  of WXestern  Europe).
Internal  reforms  have also  been important  determinants  of the  success  or
failure  of trade  liberalization  attempts. The lack  of labor  mobility
(including  restrictions  on labor  reallocation  within  a firm  and the
requirements  for  high severance  payments),  restrictions  to  entry  and  expansion
of firms,  as well  as restrictions  to exits  of firms  (including  distress
financing  to firms  that  are  and  will  never  be profitable  at the  new
undistorted  relative  prices),  could  severely  reducef  the  benefits  of trade
liberalization  and even  put the  whole  reform  effort  in  jeopardy. Lack  of
incentives  or regulations  that  slow  down  or  make it costly  for  firms  to
restructure  or shut  down  have  been an important  factor  in failed  or costly
liberalization  attempts  in  Poland,  F2ungary,  Turkey  (in  the  1970's),  and37
Yugoslavia. In  contrast,  deregulation  of the  labor  market  played  an important
role in the  success  of the  trade  reforms  in  Chile  (World  Bank 1990a).
Domestic  regulatory  policies  that  restricted  factor  and  output  mobility,
including  restrictions  to the  entry  and  exit  of firms,  increased  the
adjustment  costs  to the  trade  reforms  in  Mexico  and  Morocco.
Conclusions
Based  on growing  evidence  from  failed  and  successful  reforms  we conclude
that:
(1)  High  open or repressed  inflation  and  other  manifestations  of  severe
macroeconomic  imbalances,  such  as unsustainable  current  au- unt  deficits  or
very  large  positive  real interest  rates,  need to  be tackled  at the  beginning
of an adjustment  program.
(2)  Restrictions  to labor  mobility  and to the  exit  and  entry  of firms
should  be removed  at roughly  the same  pace  as trade  is  being liberalized  so
that  reforms  can  achieve  an increase  in  output  early  on rather  than  cause
unemployment.
(3)  The  creation  of a  full  fledged  financial  system  should  wait until  the
stabilization  is  well consolidated;  however,  markets  for  working  capital
financing  with appropriate  mechanisms  to assess  credit  risks  should  be created
early  on to facilitate  the  economic  restructuring.
(4)  Institution-building  including  the  capacity  to formulate  and
execute  macroeconomic  policies  and the  regulatory  framework  for the
appropriate  function  of  markets  are important  complements  to successful
reforms.
The road  to reforms  is a  difficult  one  but the  alternative  of perpetual
stagnation  and  deteriorating  living  standards  is  even  worse. Reforms  such as38
the  ones being  initiated  today  in Eastern  Europe  do  not have  much precedent  in
recent  economic  history,  but  from  the  evidence  that  we have reviewed  one  can
conclude  that  most likely  output  levels  will suffer  in the  early  years  of
massive  economic  restructuring.  However,  it  will be very important  for  the
governments  to  beware  of these  adjustment  costs  as  they represent  investment
in a better  economic  system. To make this  investment  highly  profitable  they
will need to stick  to their  policies  and  to remove  impediments  to factor
reallocation. An the  credibility  on the  reforms  start  to  build  up, the
investment  and output  response  will  materialize. The road  to reforms  in
Latin-America  is littered  with failures  that  arise  from  the incapacity  to
achieve  and  maintain  macroeconomic  balances  and/or  the  abandonment  of  well-
intended  reform  efforts  when  some of the  short-term,  unavoidable  costs  started
to appear. The reforms  in Chile  in the 1970.  and  in  Mexico  in the 1980s  took
a  long  time to  put the  countries  on sustainable  growth  paths.  Improvements  on
the record  of these  two  countries  can  be obtained  by addressing  some of the
issues  raised  in this  paper  and  reform  oriented  governments  should  be prepared
to sell  and sustain  programs  that  will take  2 or 3  years  before  starting  to
reflect  the fruits  of the  reforms  by  way of output  levels. In the short  run,
access  to external  firancing  in support  of the  adjustment  effort  could  help to
achieve  consumption  levels  higher  and  to finance  part  of the investment  needed
in the  activities  that  are  suppose  to expand  as  a consequence  of the reforms.39
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